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INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION.
Bouvier defines extradition as "the surrender by one sovereign state to another, on its demand, of persons charged with
the commission of a crime within its jurisdiction, that they may
be dealt with according to its laws." From the international
viewpoint it may be defined as the surrender of persons by one
federal state to another on its demand, pursuant to their federal
constitution and laws.
In the absence of treaty stipulations public jurists are not
agreed whether extradition is a matter of duty or discretion
merely. Grotius, Ileineccius, Burlamaqui, Vattel, Rutherford,
Schmelzing, and Kent are of the opinion that it is a matter of
imperative duty. While Puffendorf, Martens, Kluber, Leyser,
Voet, Kluit, Schmaltz, Saalfield, Hefter, MAittemeyer, Wheaton,
and a number of others equally eminent are of the opinion that
it is a matter of discretion.'
Chancellor Kent, in the Matter of Daniel Washburn, 2 says;
"It is the law and usages of nations, resting on the plainest
principles of justice and public utility, to deliver up offenders
charged with felony and other high crimes, and fleeing from the
country in which the crime was committed, into a foreign and
friendly jurisdiction;" and further, "whether such offender be
a subject or a citizen of this country, would make no difference
in the application of the principle; though if the prisoner
...
. be a subject of the foreign country, the interference
might meet with less repugnance."
Vattel says 3 that to deliver up one's own subjects to the
offended state, there to receive justice is pretty generally
observed, with respect to great crimes, equally contrary to the
laws and safety of all nations; and that the sovereign who refuses
to deliver up the gnilty, renders himself, in some measure, an
accomplice to the injury, and becomes responsible for it.
Grotis, who is still of higher authority, declares 4 that the
state is accountable for the crimes of its subjects, committed
abroad, if it affords such subjects protection. Heineccius in
Compilation by Bouvier. Extradition.
24 Johns. Cr. (N. Y.) 106.

34 Opinions of Vattel, b, 2 Ch. 6, s. 76.
b 2, Ch. 21, s. 3, 4, 5.

INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION

commenting on this statement of Grotius admits that the surrender of a citizen, who commits a crime in a foreign country,
is according to the laws of nations; and he further says that it
is to be deduced from the principles of natural law. Burlamaqui 5
follows the opinion of Grotius, and maintains that the duty of
delivering up fugitives from justice is a common and indispensable obligation.
There are several decisions of the English courts that follow the principles ennunciated by Grotius. In Lord Loughbourough's time, the crew of a Dutch ship mastered the vessel
and ran away with her, and brought her into an English port,
aad it was held that the English authorities might seize them
and send them to Holland. In the East India Company v.
Campbell,G the Court of Exchequer observed that a "government
may send persons to answer for a crime wherever committed,
that he may not involve his country and to prevent reprisals."
But the authority most relied on, is the dictum of Heth, J.,
in Mure v. Kays. In the course of his opinion he says,
"It has generally been understood that wheresoever a crime has
been committed the criminal is punishable according to the lex
loci of the country against the laws of which the crime was
committed; and by the comity of nations, the country in which
the criminal has been found has aided the police of the country
against which the crime as committed, in bringing the criminal
to punishment." However, the statement of Lord Coke of much
earlier times has not gone unobserved in the English courts.
This great common-law judge said, "It is holden, and so it hath
been resolved, that divided kingdoms under several kings, in
league, one with another, are sanctuaries for servants or subjects, flying for safety from one kingdom to another, and upon
demand made by them, are not by the laws and liberties of
kingdoms, to be delivered." 8 -Wynne in his Treaties on the Law
and Constitution of EnglandO makes very free with Lord Coke's
opinion, and asserts that it se;ms directly against the laws of
nations, and that, "if, from the very nature of society, subjects
are answerable to their own nation for their criminal conduct
Part 4, c. 3, s. 23 to 29.
'1 Vest 246.
14 Taunt. 34.

13 Inst. 180.

'Eunomus, Dialog. 3, s. 67.
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by the laws of nations, they may be justly demanded of foreign
states to which they fly; and the refusal to deliver them up is a
just cause of war." Chancellor Kent, in the Matter of Daniel
Washburn, supra,says that this remark of Lord Coke is contradicted by history, and by the great work of Grotius (which was
published in the lifetime of Lord Coke).
Shortly after the decision of Chancellor Kent, Chief Justice
Tilghman, in the case of Short v. Deacon' ° in the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania, under a similar state of facts reached an opposite conclusion as to the principle of law involved. He cites with
approval the statement of Lord Coke, and observes that Mr.
Wynne "does not seem to have been in all respects master of the
law of nations," "No states," continues Chief Justice Tilghman,
"has an absolute and perfect right to demand of another, the
delivery of a fugitive criminal, though it has what is called an
imperfect right, that is a right to ask it, as a matter of courtesy,
good will and mutual convenience. But a refusal to grant such
request is no just cause of war; no nation has the right to ask
the delivery of a fugitive for the purpose of wrecking its vengence on him."
Lord Coke mentions three memorable instances where fugitives were demanded from foreign governments and their delivery was refused. Queen Elizabeth, during the 34th year of
her reign, demanded of the French King, Morgan and others of
her subjects, who had committed treason against her; the answer
of the French King was, "that if these persons had machinated
anything against the Queen, in France, he could lawfully proceed against them; but if the offense was committed in England,
he had no right to take cognizance of it; that all kingdoms were
free to fugitives, and it was the duty of the Kings to defend,
"
The
everyone the liberties of his own kingdom ........
second instance was the demand made by Henry VIII of England, of the King of France, to deliver up to him the Cardinal
Pole, "being his subject, and attainted of treason." This demand was well considered but not complied with. The third
was the case of the Earl of Suffolk, attainted of high treason by
parliament, and demanded by Henry VII of England, of Ferdinand, King of Spain; Ferdinand refused to deliver him up, but
U 10 S. & R. 125.
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-was afterwards induced to do so, in consequence of the promise
of Henry, not to put the Earl to death. This promise was
basely violated. Another instance is that of Perkin Warbeek,
an impositor, who contended with Henry VII, for the throne of
England, and having fled to Scotland was protected by the King
of that country, against Henry, who demanded him.
Martens"' is of the opinion that a sovereign is not obliged
to send a fugitive from justice to his own country, or to the place
where the crime was committed, even supposing that the fugitive
had been condemned before his escape. Puffendorf founds the
right of demanding delivery of the fugitive on treaty only. The
Marquis of Beccaria, 12 though giving no direct opinion as to the
right of a sovereign to demand the delivery of the fugitive, from
the scope and spirit of his thoughts, was plainly against it.
Ward, like Puffendorff, seems to rest the matter on treaties or
Conventions.'3
A number of decisions from the federal courts of the United
States are in accord with Short v. Deacon, supra. Among these
may be cited United States v. Ruseher,14 in which Mr. Justice
Miller states that prior to, and apart from treaties, there is no
-well defined obligation on one country to deliver up a fugitive
to another, and though such delivery is often made, it is upon
the principle of comity, and within the discretion of the government whose action is invoked.
The United States has always declined to surrender criminals unless bound by treaty to do so. 75 Two instances in particular may be pointed out where, in the absence of treaties, the
United States declined to surrender fugitives. One Chevalier
de Longchamps, a subject of the King of France, was demanded
of the Executive Council of the State of Pennsylvania by the
French Minister, to be sent to France, and there tried and
punished, for an insult offered in the city of Philadelphia, to a
member of the legation of the French embassy. The Council
consulted the Judges of the Supreme Court, and by their advice
refused to deliver de Longchamps, who was punished, however,

11Martens'

Book 11, Oh. 3, c. 22, p. 107.
Beccaria, Ch. 35, p. 134.
"Ward on The Law of Nations.
14119 U. S. 407.
'Hohmes
v. Jennison, 14 Peters (U. S.) 540.
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in Philadelphia, for breach of the laws of nations.10 This was
in 1794. In 1793, M. Genet, minister of the French Republic,
requested Mr. Jefferson, Secretary of State, to issue a warrant
for the arrest of several persons, citizens of France, who had
escaped from a French ship of war, after committing crimes
against that Republic. Mr. Jefferson answered as follows:
"The laws of this country take no notice of crimes committed
out of their jurisdiction. The most atrocious offender coming
within their pale, is received by them as an. innocent man, and
'
they have authorized no one to seize or deliver him. "17
In the instructions from Mr. Monroe, Secretary of State,
to our plenipotentiaries, charged with negotiating peace with
Great Britain (which terminated in the treaty of Ghent), the
following passage may be noted: "Offenders, even conspirators,
cannot be pursued by one power, into the territory of the other,
nor are they to be delivered up by the latter, except in the compliance with treaties, or by favor."
Despite the opinions of several great jurists, the weight of
authority is that there is no obligation upon a government, under
the laws of nations, to surrender fugitive criminals to a foreign
power.' 8 England and Canada follow the United States in adherence to this doctrine. The obligation is created by treaty.
However, it is well to note, that it has been held that the existence
of an extradition treaty does not prohibit the surrender by either
party or country of a person charged with a crime not enumerated in the treaty.' 9
In the extradition treaties of the various countries, the list
of offenses are always set out. The list of offenses embraced in
the many extradition treaties made between the United States
and other nations number more than thirty.20 By the enumeration in the several extradition treaties of certain crimes for which
the surrender of a fugitive may be demanded, it seems that. all
other offenses not included in such enumeration are by implication, excluded from the operation of the treaties. "A demani
for extradition will not be made unless the authorities of the
country requesting it are satisfied from the papers and evidence
cL. Dall. 111.

"Vol. 1, American State Papers, 175.

Clarke's Extradition, Pp. 93, 126, 128 (4th Ed.).
"Ex Parte Foss, 102 Cal. 347; 36 Pac. 669; 25 L. R. A. 593.
21Malloys Treaties, 1776-1909; Cahrles Treaties, 1910-1913.
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submitted, that the offense for which extradition is sought is one
that, as the law then is in the demanding country, will be fairly
embraced within the terms of the treaty.''21 The decision of
the courts of the asylum country as to whether an offense is
within the terms of the extradition treaty is final, and the question can not be raised in the courts of the demanding country
22
after extradition.
The general principle of international law is that in all
cases of extradition the act or crime committed must be considered a crime by both countries. The Supreme court has
held 23 that absolute identity of statutes defining the offense is
not necessary; it is sufficient if the essential character of the
transaction is the same and made criminal by both statutes. It
is not necessary that both statutes use the same name in describing a particular crime.
For the definition of the offense, the laws of the states and
not the enactments of Congress must be looked to. This is necessary because there is no common-law crimes against the United
States government.2 4
Irrespective of treaty stipulations, governments do not deliver fugitives for political crimes. Both the United States and
England have tenaciously adhered to this principle.2 6 In the
matter of political offenses, most of the extradition treaties throw
special precautionary measures around the fugitive, specifically
providing that the decision whether or not an offense is political
rests with the asylum country. Even in the absence of treaty
the right to determine the question is undoubtedly inherent in
the government upon which the demand is made.2 7 An extradition magistrate has jurisdiction, and it is his duty, to determine
whether an offense charged is political within the meaning of the
28
treaty provisions.
In the absence of treaty stipulations, it appears from the
decisions of the courts, that it is immaterial that the person
whose extradition is demanded is a citizen of the country upon
" Cohn v. Johnss, 100 Fed. 639.
Greene v. United.States, 154 Fed. 401.
21 Wright v. Henke7, 190 U. S. 40.
"Benson v. MeMahon, 127 U. S. 457.
In re Ezeta, 62 Fed. 972.
21In re Arton, 1 Q. B. 108; In re Levi, 6 Que. Q. B. 151.
'"In re Ezeta, supra.
" Ornelas v. Ruiz, 161 U. S. 502.
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which the demand was made. 29 But in Ex parte McCabe30
it was held that where it was provided in an extradition treaty
that "neither of the contracting parties shall be bound to deliver
up its own citizens under the stipulations of this treaty," the
United States will not surrender one of its citizens charged with
murder committed in one of the states of Mexico.
Desertion from a foreign army or navy is held to be an extraditable offence in Tucker v. Alexanderof.3° * This was a fivefour decision, and turned upon the construction of our extradition treaty with Russia.
A question that sometimes arises is as to the effect of an
illegal extradition. In Ker v. fl,inois,31 one Ker was kidnapped
in Peru by one Julian and brought back to the United States.
Mr. Justice Miller held that the fact that the prisoner had been
kidnapped did not establish any right under the Constitution, or
laws or treaties of the United States, sufficient to allow the
courts to give any relief to the fugitive. However, in the last
paragraph of his opinion he said that this did not leave the government of Peru without remedy, and that under our extradition
treaty with that country (which included kidnapping), and on
their demand Julian could be surrendered, tried in its courts for
violation of -its laws. The court says in State v. Brewster.32
"The illegality, if any, consists in the violation of the soverif such country
eignty of an independent nation ......
waives the invasion of its sovereignty it is not for the fugitive to
object." "or," says the court In re Newman,3 3 can a fugitive claim immunity on the ground that he was enticed by strategem from a foreign country into the jurisdiction where the crime
was committed." The court will not in passing upon a fugitive's
plea to the jurisdiction, enter into an inquiry as to whether he
4
came into the jurisdiction voluntarily or against his will.3
In many of the cases that have come before the courts for
adjudication, the question as to the ri'qht of asylum. has b'-en
directly or indirectly involved. We can only conjecture whether
Rex v. Brixton Prison
7 2 K. B. 742.
46 Fed. 363.

"*183 U. S. 424.
' 119 U. S. 436.

7 Vt. 118.

79 Fed. 622.

uIn re Newman, supra.
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in the time of Herrod, extradition was known to and used by
that despot as an instrument to reclaim his subjects; but from
the Bibical story of the flight of Joseph and Mary with the infant
Jesus, we know that they were aware of and did avail themselves
of the right of asylum and the security offered by the assertion
of that right. In the opinion of many jurists, the right of
asylum is one of the most jealously guarded rights in free counties. Lord Coke declared this right in his much criticised statement.
Can it be said that a sovereign can convert his nation into a
felon's asylum? As a general statement this seems repugnant
to our sense of morals and good order. One writer says, 35 "But
the fact is that there is no such" right" as the" right of asylum."
In law a right cannot exist without what lawyers call a sanction
to enforce it, and a corresponding duty in some one else to recognize it. Now, no fugitive can enforce the right of asylum anywhere. From the opinion of the same writer political offenses
would seem to be the only ones out of which the right of asylum
could grow. In Ker v. Illinois, supra, Ker insisted that the
right of asylum existed by virtue of the treaty with Peru, but
Mr. Justice Miller in the course of his opinion answers this by
saying that a treaty so far as it regulates the right of asylum at
all, is intended to limit that right. From this we may infer that
the right of asylum is inherent in the fugitive. This is not an
absolute right, but one that the fugitive enjoys at the pleasure
and discretion of the asylum country.
Summing up the authorities consulted it is apparent, as has
been stated by a writer in the Nation,3 6 that apart from convention there is no right or duty of extradition." The whole question appears to depend upon treaties. Since this is the case we
are brought to observe the effectiveness of such treaties. The
United States courts contend that these treaties should be interpreted in a spirit of uberrima fide, and in manner to carry out
their manifest purpose.37 The asylum country may be unable
to enforce the stipulations of the treaty due to their own internal
weaknesses. This case presented itself when the bandit Villa
invaded American territory and murdered our citizens. Even
The Nation, Vol. 23, p. 101.
1 The Nation, Vol. 27, p. 251.
21 183 U. S. 424.
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though the Carranza government had been sympatetie it is very
doubtful if it could have enforced its obligations under our
treaty with that country. Then there is the case of Grover
Cleveland Bergdoll. Due to the conditions arising from the war,
the only defensible method of securing Bergdoll from Germany
was to make his extradition part of the terms of peace. This
was not carried out, and there appears to be nothing to do but
wish Germany joy in her adopted son.
Where the rights of third parties are involved there may
arise cases where the extradition treaty can not be carried out.
Two instances of this kind have been pointed out in an article
in the Outlook.3 8 In the case of Peter Martin who was convicted and sentenced -in British Columbia (1.876) for a crime
committed in that province, and sent by Canadian authorities in
custody to Victoria, during which transit the prisoner was
brought by the Canadian" officers, across part of the territory of
Alaska, the Government of the United States claimed the release
of the prisoner on the ground that the act of bringing him in
duress within the territory of the United States, was a violation
of its sovereignty, and the British Government acceded to the
demand. On another occasion a man charged with crime in the
United States and arrested in, Norway was duly extradited.
There was no passanger steamer running directly from Norway
to the United States. The prisoner was brought through the territory of another in violation of the other's sovereignty, but
there was no protest. Had the prisoner been aware of his right,
he could without the least difficulty, have gained his freedom on
reaching the country in question. Since those instances the
various extradition treaties have become more comprehensive in
their scope, and the spirit of uberrinza fide more pronounced,
even as to nations not signatory to the extradition treaty involved.
H. H1. GRooMs,
Attorney-at-Law.
Birmingham, Ala.
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